25 July 2008
Deciding is Exhausting
(Not surprising, really, since "to decide" literally means "to cut off" or "to kill" ... from Latin dēcīdere, to cut off: de- + caedere, to cut, hew, strike, kill. It's hard work.)
"Imagine, for a moment, that you are facing a very difficult decision about which of two job offers to accept. One position offers good pay and job security, but is pretty mundane, whereas the other job is really interesting and offers reasonable pay, but has questionable job security. Clearly you can go about resolving this dilemma in many ways. Few people, however, would say that your decision should be affected or influenced by whether or not you resisted the urge to eat cookies prior to contemplating the job offers. A decade of psychology research suggests otherwise."
Decision-making and prolonged focus both use the brain's "executive function," which "draws upon a single resource of limited capacity in the brain."
What makes choosing so tiring (it's hypothesised) are commitment and tradeoff resolution.
Commitment: "Committing to a given course requires switching from a state of deliberation to one of implementation. In other words, you have to make a transition from thinking about options to actually following through on a decision. This switch ... requires executive resources."
Tradeoff Resolution: "The mere act of resolving tradeoffs may be depleting. For example, in one study, the scientists show that people who had to rate the attractiveness of different options were much less depleted than those who had to actually make choices between the very same options." [This sounds exactly like commitment to me ...]
Implications:
- When the brain's executive function is drained, we may make very different choices than when it's not. One study found that the choices made when the brain's executive resources were depleted followed a pattern: the decisions were "reliant on more a more simplistic, and often inferior, thought process." People made worse decisions.
- We can "take this knowledge into account when making decisions. If we've just spent lots of time focusing on a particular task, exercising self-control or even if we've just made lots of seemingly minor choices, then we probably shouldn't try to make a major decision."
A number of examples of how decision-making suffers when the executive resource is over-taxed are in the article, "Tough Choices: How Making Decisions Tires Your Brain" by On Amir in Scientific American (22 July 2008).
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This research reminds me of the recent findings on distraction and impartiality. In that case, remember, when subjects' cognitions were constrained by having to memorize long strings of numbers (prolonged focus, taxing the executive resource ?), the subjects became impartial in their judgments, seemingly unable to construct arguments to justify acting with self-favouritism or partiality.
Perhaps the same mechanism described above is at work there, but with the result that making choices using a tired executive resource may be said to lead to better decisions (if you think impartiality is better) ?
07:55 Posted in neuroscience, psychology, the mind | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
24 July 2008
What I'm Reading Lately: Death, Dog Poisoning, Novelty, Flawed Heroes, Psych Experiments, Limiting Generalisations
A mish-mash of my recent online reading, pondering, etc.
>> Alpine murder mystery: Are sheepdogs being poisoned to save the grey wolf? (Independent, 18 July 2008):
So far this year, 17 sheepdogs (including Great Pyrenees) have been poisoned -- with slug poison placed inside pork meatballs -- in the high Maurienne mountains, just inside the French border with Italy. The killings seem to stem from an ongoing dispute between sheep-lovers (and shepherds) and wolf-lovers. "'The pork meat balls were left, some time during the night, most likely just before dawn, in a place where the dogs would be sure to find them. This is the work of a maniac – a madman. What if the meat had been found by a small child? There are tourists everywhere at this time of year, including many British tourists.'"
"The dogs have often died in great agony.... [The poison] causes instant and catastrophic diarrhoea and lung failure in small mammals like dogs. 'They finish up dying completely dehydrated but, before that, they drown in their own bronchial fluids.'"
There are about 100 wolves in France. There is a sheep-protection plan in place in the area, and there have been no wolf attacks on sheep in the Maurienne area for more than two years.
>> If you haven't read it yet, I recommend "Cancer & Creativity: One Chef’s True Story" (Food & Wine, July 2008):
"While undergoing treatment for tongue cancer, Grant Achatz temporarily lost his ability to taste. Paradoxically, it taught him brilliant new ways to create flavor."
>> Impossible Experiments (Psychology Today, 1 July 2008) is a small collection of research psychologists would like to do "if neither ethics nor practical reality stood in your way." What interests me is that almost all the comments (so far) are about one hypothesis, that how parents raise their kids doesn't influence them significantly. The experiment I would jump on is Tamler Sommers' "Another Man's Shoes." (The YouTube video at the end makes clear that the whole thing is a joke ... or is it?) Other never-done experiments.
>> "Our Infantile Search for Heroic Leaders" by Johann Hari (26 June 2008, Independent). Hari's thesis is two-fold: That there are no perfectly good leaders and that we can't expect leaders to solve our problems because "every civilising advance in history ... was won because ordinary people banded together and agitated for it." Not much new there, but what interested me about this article was Hari's critique of Mandela, Gandhi, and Churchill as flawed leaders. I never knew that Churchill, for instance, was "strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes." His portrayal of Gandhi as a murderer (of his wife) seems overdone, not because I don't believe it's possible but because even as Hari presents it, it sounds more like a matter of adhering to principles in one case (his wife's illness) and not in another (his own illness), a rather ordinary though insidious trait.
>> Reframing Questions by Dave Pollard at How To Save the World (16 July 2008) seeks to promote critical thinking, to help us think beyond our own "false myths and limiting generalizations." He gives some examples of some limiting myths and generalisations he encounters everyday in business, then reframes the questions, and then asks his readers: "What are the false myths and limiting generalizations that you are struggling with, and how might you use appropriate questions to reframe them, disempower them, put them to rest?" Some day I may give some energy to it and respond to that challenge here.
>> "Why We Like New Stuff" (Mental Floss, 16 July 2008). Basically, "our brains are actually hard-wired to prefer novelty and adventure. ... In fact, research on the ventral striatum (the part of the brain associated with rewarding behavior) seems to indicate that sating our sense of adventure provides us the same sort of satisfaction we get from sex and food." Dopamine figures, too. Full study (7 pages, PDF).
>> "Italian Outrage Over Roma Drowning Photos" (21 July 2008, CNN) is confusing to me. "Italian newspapers, an archbishop and civil liberties campaigners expressed shock and revulsion on Monday after photographs were published of sunbathers apparently enjoying a day at the beach just meters from where the bodies of two drowned Roma girls were laid out on the sand."
I think I might be creeped out if dead people were lying on the beach -- I'm creeped out when a dead seal or horseshoe crab is lying on the beach -- but the sunbathers' critics aren't shocked that they're not repulsed enough, presumably; they're shocked that the sunbathers are indifferent to the bodies. Shocked that they can act as if they aren't there, that they can do what they would ordinarily do without creating a sacred space for the bodies, without making their deaths the focus. That doesn't seem so bad to me. In any important way, the girls are not there, so why regard the dead bodies as something sacred, something whose presence means we should act differently than we do ordinarily? I guess it's because death is seen as such a powerful force.
The Archbishop of Naples, Cardinal Crecenzio Seppe, said in his blog that "'To turn the other way or to mind your own business can sometimes be more devastating than the events that occur.'" I'd agree if the girls were injured or needed lifesaving efforts; then it would be cruel to be indifferent. But I don't see how the sunbathers' can really mind the dead girls' business now, or why they should.
I've been in the presence of someone in the moments of her death, and in the presence of her body, as it lay in her house, for a couple of hours after that. The moment of dying, yes, that felt like something happened, something a little unusual and yet not, like breathing in and out. But for the hours afterwards? My experience was that life went on in its ordinary way. If I hadn't felt that all along that morning, I would have when the mortuary folks came with their plastic garbage-like bag and heaved her body into it. It was about as sacred-seeming as bodies under beach towels on a sunny day.
(In a twisted way, it kinda reminds me of this ...)
06:15 Posted in animals , death , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , politics, government and law , pop culture , science and tech , travel and place | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
19 July 2008
Reason-Giving: Four Kinds of Reasons
At the heart of Tilly's book Why? (see previous post) are the four kinds of reasons he posits: conventions, codes, stories and technical accounts.
Conventions and codes don't posit cause-and-effect; they simply appeal to socially appropriate formulas as explanation:
CONVENTIONS -- Conventionally accepted reasons. Examples: My train was late, I wasn't in the mood, she's just lucky, gotta run, I'm so busy,
CODES -- Rules, basically. Particularly relevent in law, medicine, the military, government, religion, diplomacy, sports and so on.
Stories and technical accounts do posit cause-and-effect:
STORIES -- Explanatory narratives, usually used for exceptional, unusual, or unfamiliar events.
TECHNICAL ACCOUNTS -- cause-and-effect explanation used by authorities and specialists in their fields (engineers, physicians, programmers, artists, etc.)
To show the difference among these, Tilly starts the book with a discussion of causes put forth early on, by politicians and survivors, for the 9/11 terrorists attacks:
Story: Terrorists did it, but lax officials let them do it.
Convention: Modern life is dangerous.
Code: Because we have freedom to defend, we must combat terror.
Technical accounts: (Not many given initially. Later, specialists gave accounts of "how airplane crashes brought down supposedly unshakeable buildings, what went wrong with American intelligence," etc.)
He notes that "intermediate forms of reason giving exist. One form sometimes mutates into another as people interact. In religious communities, 'God wills it' stands halfway between a convention and a story, having more or less explanatory power depending on prevailing beliefs about divine intervention in human affairs."
He also makes clear that all of these ways of relating are also used to accomplish things other than give reasons. For example, stories also "amuse, threaten and educate;" technical accounts also "display their providers' expertise and signal where the experts stand on divisive issues;" conventions also "mark boundaries between insiders and outsiders, fill lulls in conversations, and convey accumulated ideas from one generation to the next."
More about each:
CONVENTIONS
Conventions, like etiquette, "mix propriety and self-interest." Etiquette "consists of supplying appropriate, effective reasons why -- for things you do, and for things you won't do. Good etiquette incorporates conventional reasons. The reasons need not be true, but they must fit the circumstances" and, even more, the relationship.
Some conventions consist of 'serviceable excuses' that try to normalise relationships. An example Tilly gives is of someone who's illiterate asking a stranger in a store to read something for them, with the explanation that they forgot their glasses. Other examples of 'serviceable excuses' we give to conceal "our suddenly revealed incompetence" include Sorry - I thought this was someone else's office, These gears always grind, The map was wrong, It's too loud to hear anything, etc. We use these to avoid embarrassment, to "prove that the relation between ourselves and others is not what it might seem." Sometimes, Tilly notes, we give similar explanations not to express our social competence but to "explain a failure as a result of excusable incompetence" (my watch stopped, I'm sick, I'm new in town, I've never done this before, etc.)
Tilly says that justification occurs in all types of reason-giving, but that "justification by means of convention ... has a peculiar property: participants rarely take the reason proposed seriously as a cause-effect account, and more often treat it as a characterization of the relationship, the practices, and the connection between them. A good reason offers an acceptable characterization."
CODES
Using codes as reasons is all about matching the case at hand to the code in the book: "Asked to justify a decision, adjudicate a dispute, or give advice, skillful users of codes find matches between concrete cases and categories, procedures, and rules already built into the codes. Like conventions, reasons based on codes therefore gain credibility from criteria of appropriateness rather than from the cause-effect validity that prevails in stories and technical accounts."
"Sermons, classes, Power-Point presentations, manuals and how-to books often present codes: briefly stated principles followed by practical applications. Their very formats separate them from everyday social interchange. ... Job applications, survey interviews, resumes, obituaries, and citations for honors typically require either their authors or some specialist to convert accounts initially presented in story form into stylized facts to match well-established codes."
Tilly gives lots of legal and medical examples, especially malpractice.
STORIES
Stories "truncate cause-effect connections. They typically call up a limited number of actors whose dispositions and actions cause everything that happens within a delimited time and space. ... Stories inevitably minimize or ignore the causal roles of errors, unanticipated consequences, indirect effects, incremental effects, simulataneous effects, feedback effects, and environmental effects."
(All those errors and effects are what interest me -- as well as what the 'actors' think, feel and do -- and may explain an aversion I have to stories that omit those messy things.)
Stories make meaning, make "the world intelligible. ... Stories provide simplified cause-effect accounts of puzzling, unexpected, dramatic, problematic or exemplary events. ... [T]hey often carry an edge of justification or condemnation. ... The story usually gives pride of place to human actors. When the leading characters are not human" ... (animals, God, storms, etc.) "they still behave mostly like humans. The story they enact accordingly often conveys credit or blame. ... Stories exclude ... inconvenient complications [like those errors and effects named above]. ... Even when they convey truths, stories enormously simplify the processes involved."
Elements of stories and when we choose to tell them:
- Stories explain events in question, when conventions and general principles won't do
- Stories often assign blame to the actors involved, omitting other non-actor causes
- There are master stories that recur frequently[ i.e., myths?]: "A let B down and B suffered," "C and D fought to a standstill," etc.
- Stories usually have some kind of moral, even if subtle through assigning praise or blame
This paragraph was most enlightening for me, articulating something felt but not always consciously understood:
"As with conventions the choice of stories obviously has consequences for later relations among the parties to the stories, and typically involves justification or condemnation of certain practices. If I tell you that a mutual friend has cheated me, I am simultaneously aligning you with me against the friend and warning you not to trust the friend .... That is why hearing stories often upsets us and sometimes incites us to challenge the teller: if we accept the story, we take on the consequences."
"Superior stories" are those that are simplified to the greatest degree and are also closest to truth; that is, they get their cause and effect right. These stories are widely accessible and persuasive.
TECHNICAL ACCOUNTS
Technical accounts "combine cause-effect explanation (rather than logics of appropriateness) with grounding in some systematic specialized discipline (rather than everyday knowledge). ... They assume shared knowledge of previously accumulated definitions, practices and findings. For that reason, outsiders often consider technical accounts inpenetrable because they are so hermetic or ... filled with jargon."
Their relationship work is that they "signal relationships with possessors of esoteric knowledge, saying you're one of us to other sympathetic specialists, marking differences within the field from others with whom the author disagrees, providing introductions to the field ..., and establishing the author's respectablity vis-a-vis respectful nonspecialists."
Technical accounts use codes to match and measure cases against norms and standards, and they go on to posit cause and effect based on this.
Tilly's examples concerns violence, crime, the National Academy of Sciences, privatizaton of common resources, property rights, Jared Diamond's book Guns, Germs and Steel, etc.
(I find most of the examples in this book pretty tedious and very skippable.)
My Conclusion
After reading this book, I have the sense that pretty much every reason we give others or ourselves, or hear from same, is either formulaic or a highly simplified mythic account. Is that it?
I've been trying out reasons in my head -- all stories, so far, because that's the only place where it seems that complexity and doubt could enter -- conventions are not complex per se, codes may be complex but are also pro forma to some extent, and technical accounts aren't that useful for discussing ordinary relationships) -- for various actions I've done, and even when they sometimes include mention of coincidence, feedback effects, incremental effects, etc., they still, I can't help but notice, omit a lot of contributing factors, either because I want to minimise those factors when I present the reasons to myself, or the story gets unwieldy with so many offshoots -- perhaps with cause-and-effect accounts, there is a tendency to weight the contributing factors and to present those writ bold because they seem significant and seem to account for most of the outcome. My life experience, though, tells me that my justifications and reasons-giving after the fact are liable to be misinterpretations of reality, the result of my mind imposing actions, feelings and thoughts (and cause and effect hypotheses) into a biased framework.
I understand, reading this book, why I have felt at times so slighted by someone I considered a friend, when he listens to my story (sometimes a reason-giving story, sometimes not) and responds with what feels to me like a pat convention ("You know it's wrong to do that." "Well, these things happen." etc.) I've done the same thing and felt the chilling effect it's had on the reason-receiver, too. Now I wonder if answering a friend's drama with a conventional response always necessarily reveals either (1) an intention to push the other away, to make an intimate relationship more distant, or, likewise, (2) an intention to change the relationship's power balance -- the one offering the convention is in effect saying, "I'm superior," or is at least making a claim to more power than she currently has within the relationship.
13:10 Posted in books and reading , community , language , lists , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , pop culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
Choice and Happiness
Scott Adams (Dilbert creator) writes (almost a year ago):
"We know from workplace studies that the biggest factor in employee satisfaction is the degree of control workers have over their jobs, assuming other factors such as the pay and the hours are somewhere in the normal range. People like choice more than they like the thing they choose.
"When you make your own choices, you manipulate cognitive dissonance in your favor. No matter what you choose, it seems like a better option than it really is because you chose it."
I don't think any 'real' Buddhist would say this, but it seems to me that most of Buddhist practice, at the core, is meant to be a remedy for this seemingly universal human tendency to equate a sense of control with happiness.
Most of life is not controllable. We don't have a choice about many things. Being born and dying, for instance. :-) We often can't control our own thoughts and actions, much less those of other people, or circumstances. So this tendency to equate control with happiness leads to suffering, as we see again and again that we are not 'the deciders,' and even when we are the deciders, we decide wrong. Still, we try to be the deciders. It feels good to be in charge rather than to be told what to do or to have circumstances forced upon us.
Making choices and feeling in control is a key way of finding ground. Feeling we're in control gives us the illusion, first of all, that there's an "I," an identity that is constant and solid, and second, that we have power, that we can determine outcomes. And we do have power. We can affect some outcomes. There's also luck, timing, and other people's power, which thwart our sense of control, and even when we do exert control, there's our own ambivalence about alternatives (which diverts our power), our indecision, our poor judgment, our lack of wisdom, and the unravelling of unforeseen consequences, which remind us that even when we act with control and power we may not actually control outcomes.
I guess the question is, if I consciously and over-and-over choose to let go of needing to feel a sense of control in order to feel happy, am I still holding on to a sense of control in making that choice? And what then?
(photo: cat, staring up at bird's nest)
07:10 Posted in girardian anthropology , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , politics, government and law | Permalink | Comments (3) | Email this
18 July 2008
Reason-Giving
I read about sociologist Charles Tilly's book Why?: What happens when people give reasons ... and why (2006) at about the same time I watched a "House, MD" episode (It's A Wonderful Lie) in which House says, "The only reason to give multiple reasons is that you're searching for what the person wants to hear." That struck me as exceedingly true, and I thought that Tilly might have more to say about what's behind reason-giving.
Tilly says that reason-giving happens only in relationships (and only in human ones) and he makes a direct connection between reason-giving and status within the relationship, or, the perceived equality of the relationship. The main determiner of the kind of reason we give is not the behaviour we're explaining or the situation, but rather the relationship we have with the person to whom we're giving the reason:
"Reason giving resembles what hapens when people deal with unequal social relations in general. Participants in unequal social relations may detect, confirm, reinforce or challenge them, but as they do so they employ modes of communications that signal which of these things they are doing. In fact, the ability to give reasons without challenge usually accompanies a position of power."
Reason-giving can be verbal, and it can also be through pantomime, or "body gloss." He offers the example of a girl entering a congregating area in a ski lodge, who wants to "see and be seen by boys," giving for all the world the "appearance of looking for someone in particular." She's proferring an unspoken reason for being there, for looking around, one that contradicts or hides her true reason.
As Tilly notes early on,
"people do not give themselves and others reasons because of some universal craving for truth and coherence. They often settle for reasons that are superficial, contradictory, dishonest, or -- at least from an observer's viewpoint -- farfetched. Whatever else they are doing when they give reasons, people are clearly negotiating their social lives. They are saying something about relations between themselves and those who hear [or observe] their reasons."
Reasons, Tilly says, are always given to define, or redefine, the relationship between the parties. They are given to create, confirm, negotiate, or repair relationships. "Appropriate reasons vary dramatically with the equality, inequality and intimacy or distance of the relationship." Superiors can give perfunctory reasons to inferiors, as can those in distant relationships. In fact, it would likely be "intrusive or embarrassing" to give elaborate reasons to someone you don't know well. Inferiors, otoh, usually have to offer defensible and sometimes apologetic reasons to superiors, as do intimates. Though there is much social pressure to give appropriate reasons to each other, most of us are skilled at this and so usually don't notice reasons unless the reason given doesn't match our view of the relationship.
I'll post soon about the four types of reasons Tilly identifies and explores. (And yes, many reasons are combinations of the four, not pure examples.)
17:45 Posted in books and reading , community , language , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , pop culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
17 July 2008
Need for Sense of Control, Either Personal or External
Overcoming Bias points to an article in the July 2008 issue of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (links to full text here but it's fee-based, or available through your library system) that examines four psychological experiments and concludes that when we feel a weak sense of personal control, we are more likely to believe "in the existence of a controlling God" and to defend "the overarching socio-political system." The authors discuss "the implications of these results for understanding why a high percentage of the population believes in the existence of God, and why people so often endorse and justify their socio-political systems." Sounds interesting -- I hope to read more when the July issue is available via my library system's EBSCOhost subscription.
This hypothesis seems in line with earlier reporting correlating that the longevity of communities with their religious underpinnings (religious communities last longer than secular ones, on the whole) and finding that the communities persist longer when those underpinnings (and the lifestyle they lead to) are stricter, more controlling.
Marginal Revolution commented on the same article, hypothesising that similar effects may hold for medicine and media, i.e., that we'd be more likely to believe that doctors are effective when our health is in jeopardy and that we'd be more likely to believe in media accuracy when we believe we need that media information in order to be safe. In all cases, we want to feel that someone is in control.
08:40 Posted in community , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , politics, government and law , pop culture , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
11 July 2008
Distraction = Less Hypocrisy, More Impartiality ?
On the face of it, this study (described below) seems to challenge the Buddhist ideas that letting go of distraction (labelling it as such, and not following its threads) and practicing mindfulness are tools towards more compassionate action ... (also, NYT article on distraction and its deleterious effect on creativity and critical thinking), although it seems perhaps that what's actually at stake in this study, and in Buddhism as well, is finding an end-route around habitual thinking (and its attendant fantasies, judgments, status-check-ins, comparisons, opinion-making, ego defenses, etc.) rather than the pure benefits of distraction as one way to do it:
"Why We're All Moral Hypocrites", by Robin Nixon at LiveScience, posits that we are more lenient on ourselves than others, that we "judge others more severely than we judge ourselves. ... [We] are loathe to admit, even to ourselves, that we sometimes behave immorally. A flattering self-image is correlated with rewards, such as emotional stability, increased motivation and perseverance."
The article describes a recent study in which 42 students were asked to assgn tasks to themselves or to the 'next participant.' The tasks might be "tedious and time-consuming" or "easy and brief." The students could also opt to have a computer assign the tasks, randomly. The researchers found that 85% of the students "passed up the computer’s objectivity and assigned themselves the short task -– leaving the laborious one to someone else" and they characterised their decision as fair. Another group of 43 students, merely observers of all this, considered the actions unfair.
Then the researchers "'constrained cognition' by asking subjects to memorize long strings of numbers. In this greatly distracted state, subjects became impartial. They thought their own transgressions were just as terrible as those of others."
The analysis: "[W]e are intuitively moral beings, but 'when we are given time to think about it, we construct arguments about why what we did wasn't that bad.'" [That explains the hypocrisy, in restrospect, but not the partiality, in the moment -- unless perhaps the partiality is habitual, an action formed and/or strengthened by being justified day by day with a succession of persuasive defensive arguments ...]
The lead researcher even went so far as to say that their research suggests that "ubiquitous Blackberries and iPods may make society more just."
09:00 Posted in community , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
09 July 2008
Causes: Snobbery (Notes from Status Anxiety)
Notes from Alain de Botton's Status Anxiety (2004). This is the fifth post on this topic; the first is here.
CHAPTER 4 - SNOBBERY
Snobs give highly conditional attention. They believe there is a flawless equation between social rank and human worth.
When with a snob, we sense how little of who we are, apart from our status, will be able to govern their behaviour towards us.
As babies (if we're lucky), we're loved and looked after for who we are, presumably [I would argue with this.]. As we mature, affection from others depends on achievement, on our being polite, successful, etc.
Snobs combine a weak capacity for independent judgment with a strong appetite for the views of influential people.
(I'm sure de Botton said much more than this, but this is all I wrote down!)
16:55 Posted in books and reading , community , girardian anthropology , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , pop culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
07 July 2008
Handy Dandy Girard Synopsis
I find this a useful encapsulation of some of Rene Girard's primary ideas, as well as an interesting analysis and extrapolation of those ideas in the field of psychology.
He expresses well, I think, how desire works:
"The relationship of imitation (often mutual) between the desiring person and the mediator of their desire is deeply important. Objects of desire are largely interchangeable, but the bond between the individual and the mediator of his or her desire is far stronger than this. This relationship of imitation can be manifested in a deep attraction between the top mimetic partners, an attraction that can transform into antagonism with incredible ease. Both the attraction and the antagonism find a common source in the imitative relationship that exists between the two partners. In such a mimetic relationship the one who desires wants to be like the model of his or her desire in all things, to occupy their position." ...
"For instance, two friends desire the same woman and become each other’s rival. For Girard, the most important relationship in this classic love triangle is the relationship between the two friends. In such a relationship the woman may well be interchangeable with almost any other woman. What makes her significant is not what she is in herself, but what she is as surrounded by the aura of the other’s desire. She is desirable because she is desired by the other." ...
"Mimetic desire can explain why we often chose as models of desire people who are indifferent to us or despise us (unsmiling models create the aura of desirability that goes with top brand products). Their indifference is seen to be indicative of a self-sufficiency that we lack. We desire to be self-sufficient like them and so we desire the objects that they desire."
10:25 Posted in girardian anthropology , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
Causes: Lovelessness (Notes from Status Anxiety)
Notes from Alain de Botton's Status Anxiety (2004). The book generally aligns with mimetic theory and Girardian ideas; I've added a G near comments that seem to do so particularly.
This is the second post on this topic; the first is here.
CHAPTER 1 - LOVELESSNESS
Each adult is defined by two great love stories, (1) the quest for sexual love, and (2) the quest for love from the world. The first is acceptable and celebrated; the second is secret and shameful.
Love is a kind of respect, a sensitivity on the part of one person to another person's existence. It's attention, the feeling that one is the object of concern, that one's presence is noted, ones views are listened to, ones needs are ministered to. The loved one feels the "benevolent gaze of appreciation."
The impact of low status is not primarily material for most people. It's in the challenge that it poses to one's sense of self-respect. We will sustain many material hardships if we have an awareness of being held in esteem by others.
Being ignored drives us to "rage and impotent despair," said William James, in The Principles of Psychology, 1890. James also argued that "The attention of others matters to us because we are afflicted by a congenital uncertainty as to our own value." G Others' judgments and responses to us hold us captive.
The place we occupy in the world determines how much love we are offered and in turn whether we can like ourselves or lose confidence in ourselves.
05:35 Posted in books and reading , consumption , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , politics, government and law , pop culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
24 June 2008
Tuesday Bits: Grief, What Moves Through Us, How Will We Be Remembered?
Some of what moves through us, and how it keeps us moving.
sunlight, air, water, nutrients, blood, instincts, our neurons' electric spark, sensations, perceptions, information, ideas, conceptions, conversations, emotions, communion...
I like it, and I think I like the colours he uses for the words even more.
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Leroy Sievers (My Cancer) asks how you want people to remember you. My instinctual response is, I don't. Maybe, somehow, in these things Dave Pollard lists, above, that move through us, but without my name attached. Maybe I don't want to be remembered or missed in my absence so much as felt in my presence. Ask me another day and I might respond differently. Sometimes I feel anxious and sad when I think about so much personality and experience (each person's) removed from our midst in an instant, never to be replicated in exactly the same way (or so I believe) ... Of what use was it all, all this striving, all this becoming, all these relationships, all this unique composition of particles, waves, energy, self? Then I answer myself: of no use. That's a calming thought somehow.
I like this aspiration, in the comments: "That I went through my bout with cancer with ... a sick sense of humor." Another one says, "Off to get fresh bread for breakfast. Please remember that I did things like that."
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Addicted to grief ... In the journal 10 May 2008 issue of Neurolmage, UCLA scientists report a study of grief that may help explain why some people "grieve and ultimately adapt, while others can't get over the loss of someone held dear." Grief may be an addiction; thinking about the loss may stimulate the reward region of the brain, which provides the griever with a kind of pleasure in the midst of pain. The reveries about the loved one may not be felt as emotionally satisfying, but they may be craved and re-enacted because of the reward response they trigger in the brain.
The lead author of the study, asst. professor of psychiatry Mary-Frances O'Connor, explains:
"'The idea is that when our loved ones are alive, we get a rewarding cue from seeing them or things that remind us of them. ... After the loved one dies, those who adapt to the loss stop getting this neural reward. But those who don't adapt continue to crave it, because each time they do see a cue, they still get that neural reward. Of course, all of this is outside of conscious thought, so there isn't an intention about it.'"
In the study, women whose mothers or sisters had died of breast cancer looked at either a photo of their loved one or a photo of a female stranger while their brains were scanned. They found that while both those with complicated grief (the kind that continues and can be debilitating) and with uncomplicated grief have activity in the pain network of the brain after looking at the photo of the loved one, only those with complicated grief showed significant activation in the nucleus accumbens, a region of the brain associated with reward.
What this synopsis of the study doesn't say is whether someone is chemically determined to have complicated grief with every loss or only with some losses.
Abstract and link to full report ($) here.
11:17 Posted in community , death , health and medicine , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , simple living | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
20 June 2008
Friday Odds and Ends
I've read Leroy Sievers' My Cancer every morning for a couple of years. It's often a difficult way to start the day, and it's an important touchstone for me, too. His latest scans showed cancer in multiple places (9 June) and his story seems to be taking yet another turn. Many of the commenters also have cancer or care for someone with cancer.
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This blog entry, by Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution today, from and about the novel Atmospheric Disturbances, got my attention:
"'It may be that friendship is nourished on observation and conversation, but love is born from and nourished on silent interpretation. ... The beloved expresses a possible world unknown to us ... that must be deciphered.'
"That is Gilles Deleuze and it is the front quotation in the new novel Atmospheric Disturbances, by the very beautiful Rivka Galchen. The key premise of this novel is that a 51-year-old psychiatrist suddenly believes that his wife has been replaced with an exact look-alike; he refers to her as the Simulacrum. I read it straight through."
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I'm still reading Alain de Botton's Status Anxiety and about to begin Charles Tilly's Why: What Happens When People Give Reasons ... and Why. When I saw it recommended, it reminded me of a House MD episode, "It's a Wonderful Lie" (ep. 4x10), and House's assertion that the "only reason to give multiple reasons is that you're seasching for what the person wants to hear."
11:51 Posted in books and reading , health and medicine , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , pop culture | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
18 June 2008
Night Owl to Morning Person?
Deepa Ranganathan at Slate gets doctor's advice for making the transition from late-night party girl to virtuous greeter of the dawn -- or at least, observer of the sun while it's still in the eastern sky ...
Fun article. She speaks of morning people, "who count among their ranks Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi, nearly every American president, and even Jesus. (See Mark 1:35: 'And in the morning, rising up a great while before day, he went out, and departed into a solitary place, and there prayed.') Night people are stuck with psychopaths like Adolf Hitler and Juan Arreola, the guy in Pennsylvania who nearly killed his girlfriend's 2-year-old last year, explaining to a judge, 'I'm not a morning person.'
The advice is pretty simple:
1. Choose a new wake-up time no more than two hours before your current wake-up time
2. Avoid bright light a few hours before bedtime. Wear yellow sunglasses if you have to.
3. Don't drink caffeine or alcohol after 3 p.m.
4. Take an over-the-counter melatonin supplement six or seven hours before the old bedtime each day.
5. On waking, immediately take a half-hour walk, so as to soak up the sun. Where I live, this experiment can take place every month of the year if the aspirational rising time is 7:45 or later, or if it's earlier, only during those months when the sun makes an appearance before you do. In any case, try to choose a time when the sun is not only up but also effective: "Outside, sleet fell from a heavy, gray sky. 'This is the kind of morning that makes you glad to be alive,' my boyfriend grumbled.")
(Note: I'm writing this while I'm wide awake and setting it to publish at 6 a.m. on Wed., when I won't be.)
06:00 Posted in health and medicine , neuroscience, psychology, the mind | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
17 June 2008
What Have You Done For Me Lately?
Interesting psychological phenomenon: After one person does a favor for someone else, the recipient values the exchange more highly than the giver does (probably for reasons of social expectations in the roles of giver and recipient). But, as time goes on, "the value of the favor decreases in the recipient's eyes, whereas for the favor-doer, it actually increases."
One can see yet another avenue here for the hissing and oozing of resentments: In the end, the giver sees herself as generous, as someone to whom much is owed, while the recipient feels that the giver didn't do all that much, and every day the feelings grow stronger ...
Reported first at Marginal Revolution, then at Overcoming Bias.
Original study linked here ("What Have You Done for Me Lately?"), which notes (p. 2) that "researchers who study how people keep track of their contributions in exchange relationships [interesting idea in itself] have found evidence of an egocentric bias," which they posit may be related to a need for self-enhancement. I.e., we tend to flatter ourselves that we are more generous than others, that what we do is more giving.
I especially admire the detailed analysis in Flynn's paper of the (largely unspoken and unacknowledged) ritual of the giver-receiver interchange:
"For a receiver, asking for a favor places him or her in a vulnerable position. According to Goffman (1971), an episode of favor exchange is a type of ritual that 'asks license of a potentially offended person to engage in what could be considered a violation of his rights ... at the same time (the receiver) exposes himself to denial and rejection.' As such, the receiver's primary role in an episode of favor exchange is to express gratitude to the giver for not taking offense at the favor request (Green, 1975). Gratitude can be expressed in many different ways, perhaps by (1) emphazing politeness in framing favor requests (e.g., 'I'm sorry to impose, but ...'), (2) offering nonverbal signals that convey thankfulness (e.g., smiling), or (3) verbally acknowledging felt appreciation (e.g., 'thank you'). By expressing gratitude through speech and behavior, the receiver may minimize the likelihood of rejection (Drake and Moberg, 1986). ... [R]eceivers may hope that expressions of gratitude reaffirm the giver's altruistic inclinations, which is turn benefit the receiver in future episodes of exchange (Greenberg and Frisch, 1972).
"The perspective of the giver contrasts sharply with that of the receiver. A favor request presents an imposition by asking 'for something outside of the addressee's daily routine' (Goldschmidt, 1998). One might expect the giver to react with displays of annoyance and frustration, but this is rarely the case. Rather, as Goffman (1955) explained, the giver is obligated to "save" the embarrassing situation and reestablish social order in the relationship. This is accomplished by responding courteously to the receiver's request, and, if the request is reasonable, offering compliance in a generous or magnanimous fashion (Grice, 1975). An apparent imposition must be downplayed, perhaps by (1) offering compliance with alacrity, (2) refraining from reminding the receiver of favors performed in the past, or (3) making statements to diminish the significance of the favour (e.g., 'it was nothing' or 'no big deal'). The giver employs these tactics to reinforce the receiver's sense of indebtedness by refusing immediate forms of reciprocation and to maintain his or her reputation as a generous exchange partner (Blau, 1964)."
In other words, favour-seeking and favour-granting is a ritual that with one hand disrupts the peace and with the other reinstates it -- and not only does it reinstate the peace, it actually further secures the social bond, as the giver is reinforced in her 'altruistic inclinations' which lead to future giving, and the recipient is left owing something to the giver.
All of this reminds me of an essay I read recently at A rebours, looking at Rene Girard's take on "generosity" in The Merchant of Venice:
"Girard starts by observing Shylock’s explicit venality and the Christians implicit venality. Instead of viewing the Christians as moral and Shylock as self-interested, Girard shows how this distinction is a false dichotomy. For him, the superficiality and generosity of the Christians is linked to a more hierarchical and more manipulative economy than Shylock’s financial interests. ... Debt to Shylock only implies a purely economic relationship, while the generosity of Antonio places the borrower on a deeper level of debt.... 'Real generosity makes the beneficiary more dependent on his generous friend than a regular loan … grounded no longer in strict territorial borders but in vague financial terms. The lack of precise accounting makes personal indebtedness infinite.'"
13:50 Posted in community , girardian anthropology , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
31 May 2008
What I'm Reading Online: We All Need -- or Don't Need -- to Improve!
>> at Zen Habits, 12 Practical Steps for Learning to Go With the Flow. A simple list. I like the quotes, especially this one: 'Flow with whatever is happening and let your mind be free. Stay centered by accepting whatever you are doing. This is the ultimate.' - Chuang Tzu. I wonder whether the idea of accepting whatever I'm doing is consistent with Christianity, with prayers of confession, etc.
>> from Life 2.0, Follow Your Bliss. The central idea, similar to the quote above, is 'no need for self improvement.'
"The central premise behind all the self improvement stuff (although often unseen as it can be oh so subtle) is that there is something wrong with us, something flawed that needs to be improved, something we need to do in order to be happy, healthy, successful and fulfilled. It is this unexamined assumption, that we can be improved and therefore must be less than perfect, that keeps us in chains ... that reinforces this illusion of brokenness, powerlessness and being a victim-of-circumstances-beyond-our-control, which we see reflected back to us in the world we perceive around us."
Instead, this weblog counsels "an alternative to self-improvement, a spiritual path or another kind of seeking.... Vow to do what makes you happy right now and see where that takes you." Ah, but "anything we think we want, we have been conditioned to want," so it's not as easy as it might seem to do what makes us happy.
What I can't help thinking is that this plan to "be happy" is self-improvement by another name, with its implication that we're not happy enough already, and that we need to do something about this lack.
>> "Jesus Made Me Puke" by Matt Tabbi in Rolling Stone, about a 3-day "Encounter Weekend" retreat with John Hagee's Cornerstone Church:
"The program revolved around a theory that [pastor Philip] Fortenberry quickly introduced us to called 'the wound.' The wound theory was a piece of schlock biblical Freudianism in which everyone had one traumatic event from their childhood that had left a wound. The wound necessarily had been inflicted by another person, and bitterness toward that person had corrupted our spirits and alienated us from God. Here at the retreat we would identify this wound and learn to confront and forgive our transgressors, a process that would leave us cleansed of bitterness and hatred and free to receive the full benefits of Christ.
"In the context of the wound theory, Fortenberry's tale suddenly made more sense. Being taken on that eighteen-hole golf trip with the barmaid, and watching his family ditched by Dad, had been his wound. It was a wound, Fortenberry explained, because his father's abandonment had crushed his 'normal.'
"'And I was wounded,' he whispered dramatically. 'My dad had ruined my normal!'
"The crowd murmured affirmatively, apparently knowing what it was to have a crushed normal."
>> at Marginal Revolution, How To Choose An Apartment. How much does the actual living space matter, and how much does the location matter? Do we under- or over-invest in one or the other? Interesting anaylsis via comments. I now live in a house I don't really like, in a location I love. Before this, I lived in a house (including extensive grounds) that I loved in a location I didn't like. I still don't know which is better.
>> provacateur PJ O'Rourke's "Fairness, Idealism and Other Atrocities," commencement advice. His advice: make money, don't be an idealist (they're bullies), get politically uninvolved (politics is anathema to truth), forget about fairness, be a religious extremist (that is, realise that "using politics to create fairness is a sin").
About fairness:
"Well, I am here to advocate for unfairness. I've got a 10-year-old at home. She's always saying, 'That's not fair.' When she says this, I say, 'Honey, you're cute. That's not fair. Your family is pretty well off. That's not fair. You were born in America. That's not fair. Darling, you had better pray to God that things don't start getting fair for you.'"
>> 25 Things All Women Should Learn to Do Already by the women at Jezebel. Ranges from manual and practical skills like rapid vegetable chopping, masturbation, financial investing, and assembling furniture, to the more abstract realm of truth-telling, and social skills like withholding information, getting angry without being passive-aggressive, and not taking things personally. And of course, there are comments.
>> "Total Recall … Or At Least the Gist" at Miller-McCune, on the differences between gist and verbatim memory. What interests me here is the hypothesis called 'fuzzy trace theory,' which "explains how we can 'remember' things that never really happened:"
"When an event occurs, verbatim memory records an accurate representation. But even as it is doing so, gist memory begins processing the information and determining how it fits into our existing storehouse of knowledge. Verbatim memories generally die away within a day or two, leaving only the gist memory, which records the event as we interpreted it. Under certain circumstances, this can produce a phenomenon Reyna and her colleagues refer to as 'phantom recollection.' She calls this 'a powerful form of false alarm' in which gist memory -- designed to look for patterns and fill in perceived gaps -- creates a vivid but illusory image in our mind." ...
"Gist memory allows us to make snap decisions. But life does not always follow familiar patterns, and harm can result when we discard evidence that doesn't fit our assumptions."
They note that this 'misremembering' is a very common, ordinary occurence.
>> "The Candidate, the Preacher and the Unconscious Mind" by Shankar Vedantam in the WaPo. Central idea: We are biased against people who are in proximity to people we are already biased against. Second idea: We believe that people "from other ethnic, cultural and political groups are quite similar to one another, whereas they know that people from [our] own groups are quite varied."
The study he cites is fascinating:
Volunteers in a research experiment see an applicant sitting in a waiting room next to an overweight person, while others see the applicant sitting next to someone of average weight. ... "A variety of experiments have shown that overweight people suffer from discrimination; what [researcher Michelle] Hebl wanted to find out was whether strangers in the vicinity of overweight people would share in such approbation.
"Remarkably, Hebl found that volunteers rated job applicants more negatively when they had been seen seated next to an overweight person than when they were seen seated next to an average weight person. The volunteers had no idea that they were showing not only a prejudice against fat people but also a bias against people who were merely in proximity to overweight people."The experiment tells us something about the Obama-Wright controversy. The presidential candidate may have made it clear that the minister does not speak for him, but every time Wright's words are replayed on talk radio and cable TV, they automatically retrieve mental associations in many voters' minds with Obama. Hebl similarly found her volunteers unconsciously made associations even after being explicitly told there was no connection between the job applicants in the waiting room."
Similarly, "men and women seen in the company of beautiful partners are perceived as being more attractive than when they are seen in plainer company." But -- "there is some evidence our minds are especially attuned to negative associations."
>> "The Gospel of Consumption And the better future we left behind" by Jeffrey Kaplan in Orion. The article, with a focused accounting of Kellogg company work-hour policy over the years, is primarily a vision of Americans working and spending less while living comfortably.
"Machines can save labor, but only if they go idle when we possess enough of what they can produce. In other words, the machinery offers us an opportunity to work less, an opportunity that as a society we have chosen not to take. Instead, we have allowed the owners of those machines to define their purpose: not reduction of labor, but 'higher productivity' -- and with it the imperative to consume virtually everything that the machinery can possibly produce. ...
"By 1991 the amount of goods and services produced for each hour of labor was double what it had been in 1948. By 2006 that figure had risen another 30 percent. In other words, if as a society we made a collective decision to get by on the amount we produ€ced and consumed seventeen years ago, we could cut back from the standard forty-hour week to 5.3 hours per day -- or 2.7 hours if we were willing to return to the 1948 level.
"But we cannot do it as individuals." The marketplace doesn't offer "a choice to work less and consume less. The reason is simple: that choice is at odds with the foundations of the marketplace itself -- at least as it is currently constructed. The men and women who masterminded the creation of the consumerist society understood that theirs was a political undertaking, and it will take a powerful political movement to change course today."
In a sort of rebuttal to PJ O'Rourke's suggestion (above) that democracy might mean having our clothing choices, e.g., determined by the majority (of shoppers, i.e., teen girls), Kaplan notes that Edward Bernays, "one of the founders of the field of public relations and a principal architect of the American Way," decreed that "the choices available in the polling booth are akin to those at the department store; both should consist of a limited set of offerings that are carefully determined by what Bernays called an 'invisible government' of public-relations experts and advertisers working on behalf of business leaders. Bernays claimed that in a 'democratic society' we are and should be 'governed, our minds ... molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.'"
>> "Engines of Emotional Pollution" (continues here) by Steven Stosny, Ph.D., in Psychology Today, posits four mechanisms that "govern most human interactions:" contagion, attunement, negative bias, and reactivity.
Contagion for Stosny is "what makes you feel what the rest of the group feels."
Attunement is a type of contagion, or a response to it; it's when we match "the intensity and tone of [our] emotions with those of someone else." It's honouring the boundaries of social convention. Interestingly, "[a]lthough our unconscious sensitivity to others is almost always active when we're not alone, it is not always accurate, i.e., we sometimes misconstrue what other people are feeling. However, we are far more accurate in sensing what others feel than in knowing what they think. This disproportionate accuracy between sensing another's feelings and judging their thinking leads to most of our misunderstandings of one another." We're pretty accurate in knowing another person's feelings but in trying to account for what's behind them, we make wrong assumptions.
Negative bias is related to attunement: Our 'negative' emotions influence us more than our positive ones, and we 'tune in' to negative emotions more than we do to positive ones: "So if you come home from work in a fairly good mood and find that your spouse is brooding or upset, attunement will bring him or her up a little and you down a lot. To keep from being 'brought down' by the other's negative mood, many couples attempt to dull their sensitivity to the other's emotional world."
Reactivity: is "learned resistance to the unconscious pull of contagion and attunement." It can be obvious -- 'I'm not putting up with your attitude!' or passive, ignoring another's bad mood.
From a Girardian perspective, I found this paragraph, which speaks of interdividualism (as opposed to individualism) without naming it, enlightening:
"The aspect of reactivity that makes it difficult to see, let alone change, is its illusion of free will and ego independence, even 'authenticity.' You think that you are acting of your own volition and in your best interest, when you are merely reacting to someone else. We've all uttered (or at least thought) the most ironic of all statements, 'You're not going to bring me down!' As long as you're in this reactive mode, you are down -- reacting to negativity with negativity."
12:05 Posted in books and reading , community , consumption , finance and business , girardian anthropology , householding , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , politics, government and law , pop culture , silliness and humour , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
15 May 2008
Discovery of What Is
With the comment interchange about paths and truth in my mind, and a sermon from worship recently also fresh, I came upon a chapter titled "Creation in Christ" in James Alison's On Being Liked that I think is useful in considering how we think about everything, and specifically in the context of this conversation about Truth, Reality, God, the "something" that Mike posits in his comments.
It's a chapter that challenges the usual way of thinking about "the great panorama of Christian salvation," which is linear and logical: first creation, then fall, then salvation, then heaven. Alison rearranges it all, coming from a fundamental insight that we can explain creation only from the vantage point of salvation. We're not external viewers. We see everything only from where we are now. As Alison says, "our access to creation is present, as is our access to the past. ... The only access we have to the past is the access for which our present understanding equips us." Obvious, yes, and easily unacknowledged.
He also posits that "the answer to the question 'Where do we come from?' is narrated from within the schemes of power and social order which are in force. And the answer tends to maintain and shore up this order. ... [T]he description of the origins comes from an understanding of 'social' salvation which was already in evidence within the group in question."
In other words, creation stories come from a group that feels successfully ordered and constituted, and the stories are used to explain how it all happened in a way that necessarily supports the current standing. "The description of what things 'are' is strictly dependent on what they now 'ought' to be. ... [T]he perception of God is tied to the social world." Alison's claim (and Girard's) is that the Jewish scriptures divert from the usual creation stories in important ways (read the book for more on that).
Alison's major argument in the chapter is that by detoxifying death, Jesus opens us all to creation as it is and to the possibility of participating in bringing creation into being, now, every day:
"Part of the process of the discovery of creation is the discovery of an astonishing freedom with respect to what is, since what is seen and perceived, and what is are different things. When we see and perceive, we do so still partially from within a world formed by our systems of order, of security, of identity, guaranteed in the last resort by death. And what is is not strictly attainable from within a mentality formed in this way."
(These sentences seem to me to go to the heart of both the problem with strict adherence or allegiance to a path (to a point where its protection requires a defense of what is perceived as 'the sacred') and also the desirability of emptying the mind of knowledge -- necessarily beholden to perception, to interpretation -- as a way towards an experience of what is.)
Alison goes on to say that "to the degree to which we cease to have our mind and heart formed by death, we cease having our mind formed by the perception that the social 'other'" is hostile or ambivalent, and we can discover that 'the other' is "benevolent, limpid, without ambivalence and without ambiguity. That is to say, the relationship between God and everything that is, is gratuitous and trustworthy. And if it is to be trusted, then we need not fear discovering the truth about what is, however little convenient that might seem in its social repercussions." His major point here is that what we discover is "something that is present, and able to be lived in the here and now." We can put into practice ourselves "the same overcoming of our culture shot through with death, trusting in a generosity that does not know death, and which will take care of us."
The tricky part of all this is that Alison's discovery about God or reality or what-have-you -- anything -- is discovered from the vantage point of where he is now. And my discovery, and yours.
(I'm on the road this week and don't have time to parse this further online but may return to it later.)
09:01 Posted in neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
06 May 2008
What I Did and Didn't Do
There's a line in a song I like that goes "I've grown so tired of grieving for what I did and what I did not do." It's been running through my head a lot lately and it feels like grief just saying it.
In some churches, there's a prayer asking for forgiveness for sins of omission and sins of commission: "in your compassion forgive us our sins, known and unknown, things done and left undone." Is to ask forgiveness the same as to grieve? Is there a time factor at work, so that perhaps grieving comes first, then asking for forgiveness, and then absence of grief as I feel absolved; or perhaps grief, a recognition of wrong or imbalance, is sometimes simultaneous with confession?; and likewise, if I don't feel my grief, and/or don't ask forgiveness, will I continue to grieve as an ongoing process, perhaps lodged in my body as much as my heart or mind?
I'm asking because I was reading the other day that some people think resentment -- holding onto wrongs, attaching to them, perhaps even nursing them -- causes cancer (Louise Hay for one, here for another; just google 'cancer' and 'resentment' and you'll see). I don't think I'd ever say that emotion or even attachment to emotion causes physical cancer, but I think that getting stuck emotionally probably contributes in some way to an overall lack of embodied well-being.
But then I thought that maybe grief, and in particular grief about one's own actions -- or perhaps it has more the quality of regret, shame, disappointment, remorse -- might affect well-being as strongly as resentment. (And maybe they're related, concurrent.)
Even if I don't go over and over in my mind or heart some wrong I feel I've done, some good I feel I'm not doing, there is still a sense for me sometimes that I'm always being called to account for the moral right and wrong that I've done, and, even more, the right and wrong that I continue to do. How much of that underlying sense comes from the American/Puritan emphasis on individual responsibility, (Amercan) Christian teaching, the 'punishment' tendency of the current culture, my own genetic predisposition and upbringing, who knows. I know I'm not alone because I hear a lot of other people voice the same thing, though more often in talking about a sense of personal duty as necessary, meaningful, and fulfilling than in talking about how wearisome such a sense of duty feels.
The line from the song captures so well how it feels to me: the energy-drain, the resentment, the grief I feel about feeling that I have to be always grieving my imperfect actions. It's oppressive, heavy, enervating.
I find some solace, strangely, in the prayer of confession, even as it directs my attention yet again to what I'm doing wrong. And I find solace in James Alison's discussion of forgiveness. He calls it, in On Being Liked, "a process of undergoing 'being undone' from various traps, dead ends and ensnarlments," and thus being able to participate in being (re)created. That's how Buddhist meditation feels to me, too, a way of 'being undone' from ensnarement.
Alison says that faith is not about morality or about what we do: "It's a receiving something. It's someone having done something for us." It's being able to relax in the regard of someone coming towards us, someone who likes us, someone always offering us friendship.
I know the partyline on confession is that it can keep us from holding on to past sins of omission or commission, that it offers relief from the grief, but I'm after something else here. There's something in the whole standard of good and bad, in the need to measure oneself against that standard, that seems counter to who I hope and even believe God is. (And as I write that, a flood of Bible passages come to mind to counter my hope. I have another hope, thanks to Girardians, that we've read a lot of that stuff inaccurately over these many years.)
I might phrase my 'belief' as "All have fallen short, and all are falling short, so why measure? Does it matter exactly how far short I am? And striving to improve my position vis a vis that standard by doing what I think are good acts -- is there a point to that? Is faith really about morality? What if God just wants to give me something, just wants me to receive it lightly, not to grasp it but to let it undo me, and in being undone, to live life more fully, with all the passion, participation, presence, and risk that implies?"
Even that, curse my heritage, leaves me with a standard against which to measure myself, which is, to what extent is what I'm doing life-focused, to what extent death-focused? Am I acting in the flow or not? "Am I alive enough?" becomes just another way of asking myself "Am I good enough?"
Somehow, it's the measuring that prompts the grief, and the weariness, and the dissonance, and yet everywhere around us, including in religious teachings and practice, there's the encouragement and often the obligation to measure. I think there's another way, another way to be alive without the measuring. In fact, I think the only way to be alive is sans measurement. I know it for sure when I am so involved, so 'part of,' that the present enlarges and I have no sense of time passing. That is the 'flow' that so many speak of (I first read about it in Mihály Csíkszentmihályi's book about it), where measuring falls away, is undone, and something that can compassionately accommodate both "what I did" and "what I did not do" is created, discovered, revealed.
13:45 Posted in community , health and medicine , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , theology, spirituality, philosophy | Permalink | Comments (0) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
05 May 2008
Do We Miss the Moment When We Take Photos?
(Short answer, no, not any more than we ever miss the moment.)
Thank god, an answer to this age-old question with an explanation I can accept, from Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution.
Someone asks him "Is taking a photo or video of an event for later viewing worth it, even if it means more or less missing the event in realtime? What's better, a lifetime of mediated viewing of my son's first steps or a one-time in-person viewing?"
Cowen's main response is two-fold:
"If you take photos you will remember the event more vividly, if only because you have to stop and notice it. The fact that your memories will in part be 'false' or constructed is besides the point; they'll probably be false anyway. In other words, there's no such thing as the 'one-time in-person viewing,' it is all mediated viewing, one way or the other. Daniel Gilbert's book on memory is the key source here.
One of the comments, though, brings up the common theory that taking pictures can be a way of hiding behind the camera, making us merely observers of participants, creating distance between us and what we are photographing. This seems true at times for me, particularly at parties or group events -- I like to have a role that supercedes the social requirement of chit-chatting -- but not in the garden, while travelling, taking photos of close friends or family, etc. Even at parties, I feel that I am participating by being an observer, and sometimes the role of photographer seems like the role of therapist: people will reveal things they might not otherwise, because I am hidden, because I seem neutral, because I am part machine.
(Photo taken today. The robin pair, whose nest this is, was not happy to find me in the garden. I wasn't happy to find their nest so close to the ground -- in a rhododendron shrub -- knowing that neighbours' cats stalk our yard.)
12:51 Posted in animals , art and photography , neuroscience, psychology, the mind , other people said it | Permalink | Comments (1) | Trackbacks (0) | Email this
25 April 2008
Outcome Bias: Ethics of Decisions Determined By Outcomes
Rather unsurprising study results, titled 'No Harm, No Foul,' demonstrate that we judge the morality of choices by outcome -- "We call the same decision immoral when it leads to a bad outcome, but moral when it leads to a good outcome" -- and that we have a penchant both for punishing choices (or choicer-makers) that lead to bad outcomes and for not addressing bad decisi